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CULTURAL AWARENESS TRAINING IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT, ITS POSITION IN THE ESDP/CSDP TODAY

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ABSTRACT

Most civilian and military actors receive some briefing on Cultural Awareness before deployment to peacekeeping missions abroad. Such training is typically insufficient for the successful achievement of mission objectives; therefore programmes, research and case studies should be developed to refine preparation.

In this conference we propose to focus on culture from the anthropological, sociological and political point of view to provoke academicians, policy-makers and politicians to rethink this continuing problem. The nature of war has also changed, crisis management - which has become more complex and increases in complexity almost on a yearly basis. The types of intervention have also changed to multinational and multicultural projects, thus increasing the need for reforms in the cultural awareness training method.

Before arriving at the current CSDP, many treaties were signed to promote the progressive integration of European security and defence efforts. European Union conferences have been held since right after the Second World War and since the end of the Cold War. Concrete progress has been made, but the modest results achieved are at risk today from the dual blows of shrinking budgets and nationalist political impulses. And yet, Cultural Awareness has not been mentioned explicitly in official documents, even though hints have been offered in this direction. The time is ripe, within the new EU extended action service, to adopt rules that do not exist at the national levels.

Cultural awareness occupies little space in the CSDP today, and unsatisfactory results from crisis management missions, for example, demonstrate the perils of ignoring the exigencies of cultural awareness training. These principles must be incorporated into the normative consensus, as the treaties should define carefully under what terms European military assets may be engaged abroad.

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A. Background of the European integration process and Major Security and defence developments in the Eu since the end of the Cold War

1. The Creation of Post-war European Security Institutions 1945-1957

The United Nations was born from the wartime, anti-Nazi alliance. By 1945, the United States, the French and British Empires and the Soviet Union had been joined by dozens of smaller countries who declared war on Berlin in the last month of the conflict. Germany's wartime allies would mostly join the UN in 1955, while the two Germanies, East and West, joined the New York-based organisation only in 1973.

The ability of most continental European countries to decide their own strategic policy was severely limited by the Soviet-American rivalry and their respective occupations. The neutrality of several prestigious European states was also conditioned by this confrontation. This reality determined the necessity of a new orientation towards European integration:

Unlike after the First World War, the United States did not choose isolation and assumed responsibility as the number one Superpower partly by adopting a policy based on resolved intervention in European matters. Successive American governments agreed that obstacles to free trade, spread after the rise of new nation-states and the Depression of 1929 had been largely responsible of the international tensions that led to the Second World War. The implementation of a free trade policy became a basic condition for any country to receive much-desired American economic aid.

The USA promoted the foundation of a centralised European organization that administered and organised the delivery of the massive economic help of the Plan Marshall. In 1948, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was established with this aim. The OEEC helped to liberalise the trade among the members and introduced ideas in favour of monetary agreements and enhanced economic cooperation. The Greek Civil War and the establishment of Communist-dominated governments in central Europe which were slowly driving non-Marxist leaders out of power and out of their respective countries, led to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949.

One year before, in 1948, the Benelux (Customs Union between Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) had started working by introducing a common external tariff. This Union had been created in 1944, before the end of the Second World War.

The setting up of the Council of Europe, in 1949, meant another major step forward. The Council tried to incite political cooperation among European countries. However, its statutes claimed as an objective neither the union, nor the federation of States, and no sort of surrender of sovereignty is expected from the member States. Their main function has been to reinforce the democratic system and the human rights in the member States.

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Perhaps the first step in the process of foundation of the European Community was given by the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman. Schuman proposed that France and Germany and any other European country wishing to join them pool their coal and steel resources. This plan of economic integration looked to develop a rapprochement between France and Germany, moving definitively away the scourge of war in Europe.

That same year, the French government proposed the establishment of a **European Defence Community (EDC)**. This project was killed 1954, when the French Legislative Assembly itself vetoed the project. The EDC had implied strong military and political integration, but was unable to get beyond the problem of tying down a remilitarised Germany, but leaving France free to use its military resources outside of Europe, around its empire, without interference. The question was particularly thorny since the years 1950-54 corresponded with the height of French involvement in the Vietnamese conflict – a period in which the Hexagon, still devastated by occupation in World War II, was supporting half a million soldiers in the other side of the planet in southeast Asia. Thus, colonial ventures throughout most of the period known classically as the Cold War were still blocking European cooperation. The rejection of the EDC by the French parliament, when the other member states had more or less taken for granted its approval, threw all of Europe into a panic for a few months. The result was a series of quite hasty decisions taken in 1955 to create the **Western European Union (WEU)** and the

adoption of the American nuclear umbrella as Europe's first line of defence in case of attack (not necessarily true before 1955). This was also the period in which Germany proceeded with its own remilitarisation (as did Italy), a decision that was supported mostly by American President Eisenhower against the misgivings of other Europeans. However, the WEU, while it substituted the European Defence Community, could not hide the fact that "a united European military" had failed to develop – and the continent would continue to depend principally on Washington to subsidise its security. Of course, this development carried a certain price for the continent, and the WEU was relegated to a mostly ceremonial role for the rest of the Cold War.

In spite of this military mishap, the integration process continued. The **Treaty of Paris** was signed in 1951, establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (an example of Functionalist theory in European integration). It became evident that economic integration was the only practical way toward a political union that should be achieved after a longer period. The failure of the EDC had demonstrated that Europe, and France in particular, was still not ready for political and military union.

The foreign ministers of the Six, presided over by the Belgian Paul Henri Spaak, met at the Conference of Messina (Italy) in 1955. The agreements reached there indicated a concrete, definitive step in European integration: on 25 March 1957, the Original Six, France, West Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy signed the **Treaties of Rome**, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The location of Italy was not entirely coincidental, since the Vatican was also a driving force behind integration in western Europe in this period.

The next thirty years saw constant progress in the DEEPENING of European institutions, and more decisive if slow progress in the EXPANSION of the EEC. After the end of De Gaulle's presidency, the United Kingdom, joined by its diplomatic allies Denmark and Ireland, joined in 1973. After the fall of military government in Greece, the country known as Hellas joined in 1980. Portugal and Spain, also exiting military rule in the mid-70s, were keen to join by 1980, and did so in 1986. At the end of the Cold War, The Twelve, as they were known, were joined in 1995 by three formally neutral countries, whose political (but not necessarily military) position changed with the fall of the Berlin Wall: Austria, Sweden and Finland.

It was the charismatic Jacques Delors who, as President of the Commission, gave a decisive push to the deepening of EEC institutions. The Single European Act of 1986, more or less coinciding with expansion to Iberia and an increasing thaw in East-West relations, established a single European market, in aspiration without trade barriers or borders. The Act also left behind the European Economic Community and created the European Community (EC), a clear indication of deepening integration and the desire by EC leaders to move into political and financial sectors and establish more federal institutions. (This development was viewed with some suspicion by many in the United Kingdom, in some ways Europe's most militarily powerful state). At the same time, there were more speeches being made at the WEU, which began to attract the attention of some leaders eager to extend integration to the military sector. But in this period, Europe was not ready for new military expenditures.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, not exactly expected by anyone in western Europe or America, but not completely a surprise for those who lived on the eastern side of continent's political divide, where Communist parties no longer attracted young people, radically changed the security arrangement in Europe. The 1990s saw what was perhaps one of the greatest periods of demilitarisation among the world's rich economies ever experienced in history.

And yet, by 1990 a bitter joke circulated in Yugoslavia: "By the year 2000, there will be only seven countries in Europe - the EC and the six Republics of Yugoslavia." And as Europe demilitarised, expanded, integrated, deepened and sought to spend the "peace dividend", the soon-to-be ex-Yugoslavia become even more militarised, shrunk, disintegrated and defaulted on its debt load, bringing economic hardship to virtually all its more than 20 million citizens. Here too, was an old European story: apparent progress in the European integration project was ever accompanied by outbreaks of renewed nationalist pressures. That pattern, already evident before 1992, is still with the EU in 2014...

The Treaty of the European Union (TEU), also known as Treaty of Maastricht for having been signed in that Dutch town, constituted an important turning point in the European integration process. By modifying the previous treaties - Paris, Rome and the Single European Act-, and focusing on the sector of greatest interest to most citizens - *money* - there would be little pretence of a confederal, or merely functionalist, Europe in the future. Eleven of The Twelve made little effort to hide their ambition to create a "United States of Europe", a federal entity. Not coincidentally, Italy, traditionally the most federal-minded of European member states, did much to create an impossible compromise behind the scenes, once again creating the

illusion of diplomatic consensus when none existed in reality, especially in convincing the West German and Dutch governments, among the most sceptical of the plan, to sign on. And not coincidentally, the United Kingdom, the most Euro-sceptic of The Twelve, opted out of what it read clearly for the first time was a federal project with no turning back.

The Treaty of Maastricht changed the official denomination of the EC. Henceforth, it will be known as European Union. The term Union was used from the very beginning of the Treaty to convey clearly the advancement as a historical project. In this sense, article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union affirms:

"This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe..."

The Treaty would have a structure based on three pillars, according to the artificial parlance created by those who devised and drafted it. The metaphor used referred to a TEU, a Greek temple sustained by three pillars:

- the first pillar, the central one, alludes to the Community dimension and comprises the arrangements set out in the EC, ECSC and Euratom Treaties, i.e. Union citizenship, Community policies, Economic and Monetary Union, etc.
- the new pillars, the lateral ones, are not based on supranational competencies as with the previous one, but on cooperation among the governments: the second pillar is the Common Foreign and Security Policy, while the third refers to Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters.

The 1990s wave of demilitarisation across NATO and the former eastern Europe meant that new military initiatives were simply not feasible. The next important Treaty, that of Amsterdam, took place against the backdrop of some 700,000 reported deaths in ex-Yugoslavia.

2. The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) /Lisbon treaty 2007

The main change introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam was the establishment of a new post, labelled "Mr. CFSP". Javier Solana, a former Spanish Minister and Secretary General of NATO, was appointed in 1999: Secretary General of the Council of the European Union and

High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and he was charged by the member states to develop a security strategy for Europe.

The European Security Strategy (ESS), adopted by the European Council in 2003, provides the conceptual framework for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including what would later become the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The split between EU member states over the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 highlighted the need for a common strategic vision to enhance internal cohesion at an EU level. Member states thus tasked the then-High Representative, Javier Solana, to draft such a strategy.

Titled '*A Secure Europe in a Better World*', the ESS is a brief but comprehensive document which analyses and defines for the first time the EU's security environment, identifying key security challenges and subsequent political implications for the EU. In this framework, the ESS singles out five key threats:

- Terrorism
- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
- Regional conflicts
- State failure
- Organised crime.

The Treaty of Amsterdam was approved by the European Council in June 1997 and signed in October 1997 by the foreign ministers of the fifteen member countries of the EU. It came into force in 1999, having been ratified by all the member states, each following their own constitutional systems.

As a legal document, the Treaty has as its main objective to modify certain regulations of the Treaty of the European Union, the constituent treaties of the European Communities (Paris and Rome) and of some acts related to them. It does not substitute the previous treaties, but rather it is an addition.

Soon after the Amsterdam Treaty, the meetings of foreign and defence ministers in Portugal produced the **Lisbon Treaty of 2007** which saw the creation of the actual Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) which substituted its precursor, the CFSP.

B. Cultural awareness training and the CSDP.

1. Introduction-*Cultural awareness training occupies little space in the CSDP-*

Most civilian and military actors receive some briefing on Cultural Awareness before deployment to peacekeeping missions abroad. Such training is typically insufficient for the successful achievement of mission objectives; therefore programmes, research and case studies should be developed to refine preparation.

From Mary Kaldor's seminal work of 1999 "Old and New Wars", we know that traditional conflicts between two sovereign countries and therefore traditional peace-keeping belongs mostly to the past. The conflicts of today have been characterized mostly by the wars of governing elites against their own citizens/population.

The CSDP's civilian aspects of crisis management (Police, Role of law, Civil Administration and Civil Protection) and the engagement of joint foreign military personnel has become infinitely more complex, requiring better theoretical frameworks to achieve successful results. Civilian operators in particular have assumed many more roles such as Administrators, election monitoring etc... from different cultural background in the same missions. This subject, both theoretical and practical in nature, may produce the many questions.

From the moment such international agencies as the Security Council of the United Nations approve a mandate for the intervention of outside civilian and military personnel – and leaving aside the question of the legitimacy of such intervention – the issue of Cultural Awareness becomes paramount to the success of the mission, as the performance of foreign technicians and troops must avoid violation of international and local laws, rules and norms. In addition, the presence of multiple national operators necessarily includes cultural differences among the international operators themselves. Thus, inter-cultural Understanding is a key factor in mission success not only vis-à-vis the local population but also among operators of the international agencies.

The CSDP training programme includes several training providers (listed below) with efficient and sophisticated pre-deployment, mission-specific, mobile training etc. But inside the programmes there is no formal concrete or standard modules regarding cultural awareness.

Cultural awareness of course in these programmes is mentioned occasionally in a few briefings during pre-deployment training. One banal but real problem is that EU agencies at times tend to consider that cultural awareness training is managed and is the responsibility of the national commands; while of course, the national command structures expect that EU pre-deployment training will address the issue.

Such preparation does not necessarily fall under the topic of weapons and tactical strategies to be adopted. Of course, cultural awareness and understanding are part of “soft power” – and not coincidentally, those countries with historical and cultural ties to a given area of intervention are often presumed to be more successful given their “experience” in the region. Too often though, this refers to past colonial experience. At this point, let us not forget that colonialism has long been accepted as synonymous with racism, and the idea that a former colonial power has a sufficient level of cultural awareness should not be accepted in what would be, after all, a non-professional approach to the problem. Instead, there is a pressing need for a standardised, researched and tested approach to address the issue and “guarantee” mission success, avoiding the types of scandals and problems that have plagued some missions in the past. Such an approach should also include cultural awareness training in a general sense, but also during pre-deployment in a sense that will be specific to each mission. Past experience for example in Afghanistan does not mean a soldier is culturally prepared for duty in Mali.

At the current time, what might be called cultural awareness is frequently touched upon during pre-deployment briefings. However, mentioning for example that Muslims do not eat pork or that soldiers should not look local women in the eyes, hardly constitutes serious cultural awareness training. The decision to adopt such training, consistently, for each mission, can only come from a political decision by EU Ministers that will be clearly communicated and put into writing for training providers.

2. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CONTINUING PROBLEM

According to NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “there is a great need to refine strategies and materials to communicate Cultural Awareness.” In a telephone conversation with Karzai the Afghan president, on September 5th 2012, he outlined measures to try to stop the insider attacks against ISAF soldiers that included strengthening vetting procedures,

better counter-intelligence and Cultural Awareness training, and he urged Karzai to join in those efforts, according to his spokesperson, Carmen Romero.¹

Such scandals as the burning of the Holy Koran in Afghanistan in 2012, sexual abuse of children in the Ivory Coast, Haiti and Congo by military personnel, are all proof of insufficient cultural understanding of the local territory.

Current efforts in this area are under development by UN agencies including the United Nations Peacekeeping Organisation, OCHA, and UNESCO. Among international alliances, there is NATO. Despite the fact that Cultural Awareness has acquired increasing importance within NATO, there are no official general Cultural Awareness programs in place. Everything is focused on specific theatres of Operations, mainly Afghanistan and CA lectures are always presents in pre-deployment courses. And the training materials for Cultural Awareness are only: Mission Area Information, Ethical Characteristics and Code of Conduct.

As elaborated in New War theory², the current generation of conflicts tend to regard civil wars as political elites against their own populations. In this context, intervention by NATO or UN forces, for example, relies upon much more refined legal definitions (protection of civilians, ending refugee crises, protection of UNESCO cultural heritage sites) and nuanced military activities. Thus, Cultural Awareness becomes far more important for the successful achievement of military mission objectives than in the past during more traditional “Old Wars”.

Each local mission operates in an area with specific cultural norms and practices. The systematic review, communication to operators and monitoring of local norms necessitates further conceptual research and the adoption of standard procedures among crisis management institutions.

The unsatisfactory results have been evidenced in many numbers of crisis management missions around the world – and international political leaders have increasingly decried the need for training reforms on Cultural Awareness:

¹ <http://news.zurichna.com/article/eb5f7e203cf3319bfe3b1ee1002a3adc/nato-urges-karzai-to-act-on-afghan-rogue-killings>

² Kaldor, Mary (1999) *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Polity Press, Oxford

1. Brendan Nicholson, Defence Editor of The Australian, wrote in an article from August 30, 2012 that intellectual and cultural awareness for defence heads needs improvement.

*"...Education for leaders in the Australian Defence Force needs to improve and subjects should include psychology, sociology and anthropology to improve the military's intellectual base and its cultural awareness, a key think tank has warned... The Australian Strategic Policy Institute says in a comprehensive new report that improving education for ADF and non-commissioned officers is a national security issue, and it has produced a \$4 million plan to improve the system."*³

2. Jon Rabirotff and Yoo Kyong in March 26, 2013 published an article entitled "Eliminating soldiers' bad behaviour in S. Korea aim of cultural awareness classes".

*"U.S. and South Korean officials have agreed on the content for new cultural awareness programs for 2nd Infantry Division soldiers, hoping it will help eliminate the misbehaviour that has been generating national headlines here."*⁴

3. A recent Echo Sierra article entitled "Why cultural awareness matters":

*"As defence budgets shrink, battle-space digitization and automation is a tantalizing option. Let us hope joint staff will not develop it at the expense of human intelligence and cultural awareness. A cheap and effective way to improve knowledge about areas of operations would be to keep on developing partnerships with universities that have pools of experts in History, Geography, Culture, Languages..."*⁵

4. General Stanley McChrystal, the former American commander in Afghanistan is quoted:

³ <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/intellectual-cultural-awareness-for-defence-heads-needs-improvement/story-e6frg8yo-1226461136600>

⁴ <http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/bad-behavior-in-the-pacific/eliminating-soldiers-bad-behavior-in-s-korea-aim-of-cultural-awareness-classes-1.213512>

⁵ <http://echo-sierra.net/2012/07/03/why-cultural-awareness-matters/>

"We made a huge mistake one night in Afghanistan, [...] we killed a civilian farmer in the middle of the night with an attack helicopter based upon [intelligence] we had from an aerial platform. The guy was digging by the side of the road." Mistakenly believing that the farmer was planting a bomb, the U.S. military ordered a helicopter strike, only learning later that the farmer posed no threat."

McChrystal remembered apologizing to Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who informed the then-commander about Afghan irrigation techniques which sometimes involve tending the soil at night. *"That's the point: you have to know those things,"* McChrystal said, as drones do not remove the need to "get your feet in the mud and understand people."⁶

In the meantime, the Capstone Document for UN Peacekeeping Operations of 2008, Chapter 9 cites, *"Social impacts such as different cultural norms of mission staff and host country customs may create friction (e.g.: employment of women in non-traditional gender roles, mixing and socialization amongst genders, drinking, gambling, inappropriate behaviour, etc.."...* but makes no explicit reference to Cultural Awareness.

I would call this process a transition from mere Cultural Awareness to Cultural Understanding. Cultural Understanding as a concept goes further than mere Awareness, and so programmes, research and case studies should be developed to make active application of Cultural Awareness Training & Education stronger in crisis management training programmes.

This essay project will be useful to future researchers seeking examples of positive and negative case studies, as well as catalysing greater attention and a consequent increase in dedicated resources from international agencies on the topic.

My impression is that the majority of research and publication effected till now on the subject concentrates on basic level Cultural Awareness, often limited to the Tactical lower level, and my aim is to go further to achieve Cultural Understanding also at the higher command Operational and strategic Planning levels.

Ultimately, the conceptual framework that results from this research should increase the effectiveness and probability of success for peacekeeping and crisis management missions around the world.

⁶ <http://echo-sierra.net/2012/07/03/why-cultural-awareness-matters/>

3. CSDP training approaches and training providers

The EU training policy in CSDP is implemented by Member States' training providers on a national basis or through EU-level training providers:

- a) ESDC (European Security and Defence College) – With its head office located in Brussels and founded in 2005, the “College” is actually a network of national defence colleges that are linked through the European Commission and national Defence Ministries.
- b) CEPOL (European Police College) – Located in Hampshire, England, founded in 2000 and later modified in 2005, CEPOL seeks to coordinate activities among senior police officers, particularly with regards to combating international criminals.
- c) ENTRi (Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management) - This initiative is has been administered by the Center for International Peace Operations in Berlin (ZIF) since 2011 and brings together civilian operators from over 70 different countries. Its current mandate expires in 2016.
- d) EUPST (European Union Police Services Training) – Originally beginning with a French initiative in 2008, the first training sessions were held in the town of Saint Astier.
- e) EDA supported training activities – Established in 2004, located in Brussels and responding to the European Council, the EDA promotes European defence collaboration.

4. How can we improve the methodology of cultural learning in the CSDP's crisis management?

What theoretical framework and practical formulas of Cultural Understanding need to be adopted to improve the probability of success for international crisis management missions in the future?

This main question is linked to the changes and greater complexity of peacekeeping /crisis management missions and necessitates the development of the following research-related topics to fill the gaps in current theory:

1. What is the correct Cultural awareness training approach to International peace operators?

2. The space that cultural awareness project/programmes occupies in the CSDP training programme. Is it sufficient in respect to the level and type of mission operation today?

C. Conclusion.

Common Security and Defence Policy Prescriptions for the Future- Crimean Crisis.

Having surveyed the history of the World Wars, the creation of integrated European projects, major security and defence developments in the EU since the end of the cold war, the final result of the Cold War, the development of contemporary security structures on the continent and recent events, we arrive at the Crimean Crisis today. Moscow's illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula, in violation of the Budapest agreement of 1994, where the United States, the United Kingdom and other states guaranteed the territorial integrity of Ukraine in exchange for the transfer of all nuclear missiles in the latter country to Russia, represents a new period in European security and defence. As with the 1999 War in Kosovo, a watershed event is now determining a renewed emphasis on financing military resources. The recent crisis demonstrates that Russia is not a reliable military partner. In this sense, on 30 March 2014, NATO announced it would reject all further military cooperation with Moscow. At the time of this writing, the EU is still in the midst of formulating its own response to Russia. However, it seems clear that, whatever the separate developments in civilian trade, security cooperation between Brussels and Moscow, or between Russia and other individual European nation-states, is a dead letter.

It is an easy prediction that, whatever the decisions taken over the course of 2014 by and within European security structures, including the CSDP, NATO and/or the UN, Brussels and the national capitals will be obliged to adopt a renewed emphasis on military and joint military strategies. Purely national strategies would represent a dangerous and counter-productive step backwards. These "new" strategies must be adopted within the framework of existing and enhanced joint structures. As mentioned above, these structures have not yet adopted Cultural Awareness training as a formal programme at all levels, including individual preparation for military and civilian personnel, the group command level, within intra-

European joint projects (e.g. the European Battle Groups) and during deployments/missions abroad, be they in Europe, Africa, Asia or the Americas.

Experience acquired during past missions in ex-Yugoslavia, the Balkans, Libya, Somalia, Mali, Chad/Darfur/Sudan, the Central African Republic, etc. provides both positive and negative lessons concerning deployments, and the lack of Cultural Awareness training can be directly tied to many “scandals” and other legal difficulties encountered while European troops and civilians were stationed abroad.

As explained above, cultural awareness training is not a standard part of existing pre-deployment or local mission preparation. The very brief reference to CA issues is clearly insufficient and requires formal and concrete adoption after sufficient research and preparation of adequate didactic materials. This will probably require political input from EU Ministers to re-define current policy and spending strategies.

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Organisation of African Unity

<http://au.int/en/dp/ps/node>

OCHA-UN-CMcoord Office Geneva

<http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/UN-CMCoord/overview>

National sources in crisis countries (Afghanistan, Chad, Palestine, the Balkans):

<http://www.mutc.in.ng.mil/OPERATIONS/CivilianMilitaryTraining/tabid/864/Default.aspx>

<http://ochaonline.un.org/chad/Coordinationcivilomilitaire/tabid/4958/language/en-US/Default.aspx>

<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/47d4e277b48d9d3685256ddc00612265/3dcba67ee2e932af85257a25005729b3?OpenDocument>